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PATENT OFFICE PERFORMANCE IN PERSPECTIVE*

George E. Frostt
"
the only patent that is valid is one which this
Court has not been able to get its hands on."1

Jackson's note of despair reflects all too accurately the
treatment patents have seemingly received in the hands of the
courts since the "new trend" of recent years.2 It has become
the legal fashion to characterize letters patent as something the
Patent Office issues and the courts strike down. Statistical support
for this conclusion can be readily assembled.8
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• The author acknowledges the help of Mr. John Verhoeven of the Illinois bar in
the preparation of this article.
t B.S. 1940, Illinois Institute of Technology; J.D. 1945, George Washington University; member, District of Columbia and Illinois bars; Director~ Patent Law Program,
John Marshall Law School; Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago; member, Attorney
General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws.-Ed.
l Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 at 572, 69 S.Ct. 269 (1949) (dissenting
opinion).
2 See, e.g., Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632 at 636;
Trabon Engineering Corp. v. Direkes, (6th Cir. 1943) 136 F.(2d) 24 at 27. But cf.
Falkenberg v. Bernard Edward Co., (7th Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 427 at 428.
s E.g., Lang and Thomas, "Disposition of Patent Cases by Courts During the Period
1939 to 1949," 32 J.P.O.S. 802 (1950); Walter, "A Ten Year Survey of Design Patent
Litigation," 35 J.P.O.S. 389 (1953); Davis, "The Impact of Recent Supreme Court Cases
on the Question of Patentable Invention," 44 !LI.. L. REv. 41 (1949). At page 47, Davis
comments on the statistics respecting the patent cases to conclude, "This is a sharp drop,
greatly more than could reasonably be explained by any difference in methods of
compilation or in deciding question of infringement. It must be partly, if not largely,
due to the more critical application of the tests of invention, in other words, a higher
standard of invention."
A particularly significant recent statistical study is found at pages 176 to 185 and
287 to 293 of the Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks
and Copyrights, 84th Cong., 1st sess. (1955), pursuant to S. Res. 92, entitled American
Patent System. This study was prepared by Mr. P. J. Federico of the Patent Office.
It includes data covering all available district court and court of appeals decisions on
patents in the seven-year period from 1948 to 1954. Federico reports that 53% of the
patents before the district courts were held invalid and 63% of the patents before the
courts of appeals. He also includes long term tables indicating that in the 1925-1954
period the percentage of patents held invalid by the courts of appeals increased from
about 33% in the 1925-1929 period to a peak of about 64% in the 1945-1949 period. His
data for the Supreme Court covering the 1925-1954 era are surprisingly indecisive in
terms of trend.
The Federico study also covered 50 recent cases where patents were held invalid by
courts of appeals. Consistently with the views expressed herein, he found comparatively
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Some judicial expressions have taken a more ominous turn.
With marked impatience some members of the judiciary have .
pointed to the Patent Office as failing to hold fast to the standards
it is charged with applying. Thus we have Justice Douglas declaring:
"The patent involved in the present case belongs to this.
list of incredible patents which the Patent Office has spawned.
The fact that a patent as flimsy and as spurious as this one has
to be brought all the way to this Court to be declared invalid
dramatically illustrates how far our present patent system departs from the constitutional standards which are supposed to
govern." 4
And in a more recent case, where a jury had held the patent valid
and infringed, Judge Hastie protests:
"This patent of the obviously unpatentable and indications that the category of patented unpatentables is a large
one, cause us to express a final word of regret that the Patent
Office in analyzing and disposing of patent applications does
not more consistently use that expertise with which courts
credit it along with .other specialized administrative agencies."5
With this apparent unanimity of contrary expression one must
be bold indeed to question the proposition that the courts are
in fact following a stricter standard of invention than the Patent
Office. 6 Yet such doubt finds considerable support in the cases
and raises the question of how far impatience with individual
factual situations has led to general conclusions contrary to the
overall facts. Consideration of this question at the present time
is especially timely in view of current judicial divergencies refew cases holding patents invalid on the art before the Patent Office (six out of the 40
patents. in the group held invalid on prior art). He also reports that the cases of actual
"anticipation"-where the prior art is exactly what the patent claim states-were "very
few." And of the ten most recent Supreme Court decisions holding patents invalid
Federico's data indicate that where prior art has been decisive it has generally been art
not considered by the patent examiner.
The Federico study did not attempt to determine the .extent expansive patent
constructions have influenced holdings of patent invalidity.
4 Great A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 at 158, 71
S.Ct. 127 (1950) (concurring opinion).

6 Packwood v. Briggs and Stratton Corp., (3d Cir. 1952) 195 F. (2d) 971 at 974.
Compare Williams Mfg. Co. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., (6th Cir. 1941) 121 F.
(2d) 273 at 277, affd. 316 U.S. 364, 62 S.Ct. 1179 (1942).
6 It should be noted that some commentators have found in the decisions a trend
toward earlier and stricter views on patentability. See, e.g., Smith, "Recent Developments
in Patent Law," 44 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1946).
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specting the statutory definition now expressed in section 103 .of
the Patent Code.7 This consideration-coupled with observations
on the so-called "file wrapper estoppel" doctrine-also sheds some
light on the most promising directions for improvements in Patent
Office procedure.
The heart of the problem lies in making a meaningful comparison between court determinations on the issue of invention,
on the one hand, and the Patent Office determinations, on the
other. To be sure, both are directed to resolution of the same
statutory question-and in both the test is whether ". . . the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains."8
But when the circumstances of the respective determinations are
considered, important differences become apparent.
Perhaps the most significant factual showing usually available
in court proceedings and not generally available before the Patent
Office is evidence respecting the commercial impact of the invention. Extreme cases aside, it is virtually impossible to make an
abstract determination of whether a particular change is or is not
within the "skill of the art"-for the level of such skill is itself
highly indefinite. As Judge Learned Hand has stated, " . . .
[invention] is as fugitive, impalpable, wayward, and vague a
7 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. A number of courts have concluded that the code makes no
change in the standard of invention. E.g., General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove Co.,
(6th Cir. 1953) 203 F. (2d) 912, cert. den. 346 U.S. 822, 74 S.Ct. 37 (1953); New Wrinkle
v. Watson, (D. C. Cir. 1953) 204 F. (2d) 35, cert. den. 346 U.S. 820, 74 S.Ct. 35 (1953).
On the other hand Judge Learned Hand has recently found in §103 a restoration of the
more liberal patent decisions of a generation ago. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co.,
(2d Cir. 1955) 224 F. (2d) 530 at 535, cert. den. 350 U.S. 911, 76, S.Ct. 193 (1955). Cf.
Pacific Contact Labs. v. Solex Labs., (9th Cir. 1954) 209 F. (2d) 529 at 533, cert. den.
348 U.S. 816, 75 S.Ct. 26 (1954).
s 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. This test is an approximation of the "skill of the art" test
first applied by the Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, lI How. (52 U.S.) 248
(1850). There (at 265) the Court affirmed a jury charge that if "no more ingenuity or
skill [was] required to construct the knob in this way than that possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business, the patent was invalid. . . ." In the report on
the bill that became the patent code it is stated with respect to §103: "This paragraph
is added with the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stablizing
effect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which
may be worked out." H. Rep. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 18 (1952), to accompany
H.R. 7794 And in the general comments on the code the report states that §103 "should
have some stabilizing effect and minimize great departures which have appeared in some
cases." Id., p. 7. See Federico, "Commentary on the New Patent Act," 35 U.S.C.A. pp.
19-23 (1954); Harris, "Some Aspects of the Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act
of 1952," 23 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 658 (1955).
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phantom as exists in the whole paraphernalia of legal concepts."9
To resolve the indecisive situations, the courts have looked to the
commercial history of the invention-usually fully developed by
the time the infringement suit must be decided. Commercial
success of products embodying the invention,10 a long felt want
satisfied by the invention,11 recognition of the invention by licenses
taken by the industry,12 and similar considerations have weighed
heavily in the judicial decisions.13 Conversely, lack of success in
the market place has been used to support findings of lack of invention.14 All of these commercial considerations find their
logical basis in the proposition that the industry itself is the best
measure of what is normal "skill of the art."
A second broad area of difference between court and Patent
Office determinations of invention relates to proof of some segments of the prior art. The patent law defines certain prior patents,
publications, uses, knowledge, sales, and other matters which are
to be considered as part of the "prior art."15 It is with respect to
the combined effect of all of these that the test of "invention" must
be made.16 As a matter of practical necessity the Patent Office
largely confines its attention to those portions of the prior art
represented by documents.17 In consequence, items such as prior
knowledge, prior public use, and the like often do not come to
the attention of the office. Defendants in patent suits are under
no such disability and can locate and prove these elements of the
Harries v. Air King Products, Inc., (2d Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 158 at 162.
Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct.
593 (1944); Wahl Clipper Corp. v. Andis Clipper Co., (7th Cir.. 1933) 66 F. (2d) 162.
11 E.g., Hunt v. Armour and Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 722: The Goodyear
Tire and Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 (1944).
12 E.g., Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota and Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 43 S.Ct.
322 (1923).
13 Thus, in the Ray-O-Vac case, 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 (1944), the Court emphasized the successful practice of ihe patentee of offering to replace a complete flashlight
upon leakage of the patented battery.
14 "... but failure is an almost infallible test of non-invention, and for all practical
purposes Sarazin's disclosures were failures, and indeed confessed failures." Clark v.
Wright Aeronautical Corp., (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 960 at 966. And see Bostitch, Inc.
v. Precision Staple Corp., (2d Cir. 1949) 178 F. (2d) 332 at 336 (lack of problem of long
duration or unsuccessful efforts to solve the problem noted in finding no invention).
15 35 u.s.c. (1952) §102.
16 E.g., Detrola Radio & Television Corp. v. Hazeltine Corp., 313 U.S. 259, 61 S.Ct.
948 (1941).
17 The office does, however, use documents as at least prima facie proofs of the facts
they state as well as "printed publications." Thus in a line of decisions the office has
taken published articles as prima facie proof of knowledge of their contents in the
United States as of the dates the manuscripts are indicated as received by the publisher.
E.g., Ex parte Ordas, 104 U.S. P.Q. 74 (Board of Appeals, 1954).
9

10 E.g., The Goodyear Tire and Rubber
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prior art, in which event a court may strike down as noninventive
what the Patent Office has found to be invention. In such instances the difficulty is not one of Patent Office judgment but
rather one of inherent limitations on available proofs.
Still another substantial area of departure between the courts
and the Patent Office resides in the interpretation of the patent
itself. In a surprising number of practical cases the patent owner
applies an expansive patent interpretation in an effort to reach
the activity of the alleged infringer. In so doing he may take
undue license with the patent itself and in any event takes a position in court that various differences between the patent and the
accused structure or process are unimportant details. Similar
differences between the patent and the prior art are then-by the
patentee's own test-unimportant. As an early decision points out
"that which infringes, if later, would anticipate if earlier."18 Here
again we have an area of inquiry closed to the Patent Office for the
expansive claim interpretation bringing the prior art into play is
not made until the infringement problem arises.19
When the decisions on invention are considered in the light of
these factors, a surprising pattern emerges. Far from repudiating
the Patent Office, the courts, in the presence of showings of commerical success, have displayed a tendency to find invention in the
most simple changes. And, even more impressively, a significant
number of instances can be found where courts sitting in direct
Knapp v. Morss, 150 U.S. 221 at 228, 14 S.Ct. 81 (1893).
19 Smith v. Hall, 301 U.S. 216, 57 S.Ct. 711 (1937), vividly illustrates this effect. There
the patent had been involved in an earlier case, at which time the patentee successfully
urged that the claims were of scope to cover egg incubators regardless of the arrangement of the eggs. Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20, 55 S.Ct. 277 (1935). In the Waxham
case the Court had rejected the argument of the defendant there that the patent claims
were limited to the use of "staged" incubation wherein the eggs were arranged in stages
in accordance with their age. In the subsequent Hall case the defendant relied upon a
public use where the eggs were not arranged in stages but otherwise the process of the
patent was used. The Court logically insisted that the construction given to .the patent
in the earlier litigation must hold in the later suit and accordingly found the patent
invalid for prior public use.
The reverse took place in Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Graver Tank &: Mfg.
Co., (7th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 103, cert. den. 343 U.S. 967, 72 S.Ct. 1059 (1952), 344 U.S.
849, 73 S.Ct. 6 (1952). At an earlier stage in the case the patentee had emphasized the
argument that the components of the patented welding flux were fully reacted. Linde
Air Products v. Graver Tank, (7th Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 531 [mod. 336 U.S. 271, 69
S.Ct. 535 (1949) and 339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950)]. In the later proceedings the
court insisted that the patent be construed in a manner consistent with the earlier
representations and accordingly found no infringement in the use of a flux with partially,
as distinguished from fully, reacted components.
18
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review of Patent Office refusals to issue patents have overturned
the Patent Office rulings.20
Consider the fact situation of the Ray-0-Vac case.21 There the
"invention" lay in encasing an ordinary flashlight cell in a steel
jacket. The concept was the utmost of simplicity. If flashlight
cells expand and jam when exhausted, enclose them in an unyielding steel jacket. Of course some degree of ingenuity must
be exercised-for the jacket must not short circuit the cell itself.
But this could be and was solved by interposing a cardboard
sheath underneath the steel jacket, a material which had long
previously been used in flashlight cells. The result was a nonjamming construction which went into almost universal use. The
Supreme Court characterized the patent as "a very narrow one in
a crowded art." 22
20 E.g., Application of Hudson, (C.C.P .A. 1953) 205 F. (2d) I 74; Application of
Schechter, (C.C.P .A. 1953) 205 F. (2d) 185; Application of Horvath, (C.C.P .A. 1954) 211 .
F. (2d) 604; Application of Sutton, (C.C.P.A. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 582; Application of
Stanley, (C.C.P.A. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 151; Application of Twomey and Schilling, (C.C.P.A.
1954) 218 F. (2d) 593; Application of Hotchkin, (C.C.P.A. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 490; Application of Gartner, (C.C.P.A. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 502; Application of Van Deventer, (C.C.P.A.
1955) 223 F. (2d) 274; Application of Krodel, (C.C.P.A. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 285; McCashen
v. Watson, (D.C.D.C. 1955) 131 F. Supp. 233. The patent involved in Helene Curtis
Industries v. Sales Affiliates, (D.C.N.Y. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 490 (appeal pending), was
initially rejected by the Patent Office examiner and that rejection was made final. The
Board of Appeals of the Patent Office affirmed. On bill in equity brought by the applicant the court granted the bill, thus ordering the Commissioner to issue the patent.
The Patent Office took its own appeal from that decision. While the appeal was pending
the applicant presented more limited claims which met the approval of the examiner.
The appeal was accordingly dismissed and the patent issued. The patent was held
invalid in the subsequent declaratory judgment proceedings brought by alleged infringers.
The Patent Office took its own appeal in Weeks v. Warp, (D.C. Cir. 1955) 221 F. (2d)
108. There the office had rejected the claims in question as lacking invention and on
the further ground that the earlier decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
in In re Warp, (C.C.P .A. 1946) 154 F. (2d) 658, and In re Warp, (C.C.P.A. 1946) 154
F. (2d) 661, were res judicata. After this Patent Office rejection the applicant filed
bill in equity in the District Court for the District of Columbia, which held that some
of the claims were allowabJe. The Patent Office thereupon took its appeal from the
district court judgment, at which time the court of appeals reversed the district court
to affirm the Patent Office ruling.
Over a IO-year period the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in ex parte cases
has affirmed the Patent Office in 79.9% of the appeals and the District Court of the
United States for the District of Columbia in ex parte cases has affirmed the Patent
Office in 78.3% of the cases. Hearings Before the Senate Subcommittee on Patents,
Trademarks and Copyrights, 84th Cong., 1st sess., p. 174 (1955), pursuant to S. Res. 92,
entitled American Patent System.
.
The case of Hayes Industries v. Watson, 108 U.S.P.Q. 201 (1955), affords another
interesting illustration of the Patent Office examining activity. In this case the court
upheld Patent Office refusal to grant a patent on the same disclosure for which the
British patent office had granted a patent.
21 The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Ray-0-Vac Co., 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593
(1944).
22 Id. at 276.
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As might be expected, the patent examiner initially rejected
the patent application to the Ray-O-Vac battery. He repeated the
rejection after a written argument by the applicant. After an
interview with the attorney, at which time the matter of commercial success was emphasized, the examiner allowed the patent.23
Significantly, the Ray-O-Vac policy of guaranteeing replacement
of the flashlight in the event of battery damage-later emphasized
in court opinions-was emphasized before the patent examiner.
In the subsequent patent infringement suit major emphasis
was placed upon the efforts and failures of the past and upon the
element of commercial success. The district court found the
patent valid and infringed.24 Similar arguments prevailed in the
unanimous decision of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.25 On certiorari, a majority of the Supreme Court-again·
placing emphasis upon commercial success, coupled with concurrent fact findings of invention below-upheld the patent and
placed the final word of approval upon the action of the Patent
Office.26 The contention that the patent was directed to nothing
more than a steel container was rejected by the majority of the
Court with the observation: "Viewed after the event, the means
Anthony adopted seem simple and such as should have been
obvious to those who worked in the field, but this is not enough to
negative invention."27
Similiar decisions of an earlier day readily come to mind. 28
For example, in the Eibel Process case29 the Court found invention
in doing what would, in retrospect, seem most obvious, namely,
making slurry flow more uniformly onto a moving belt by inclining the belt slightly downward. The decision is of particular
interest in its emphasis upon the narrow character of the invention
as an improvement upon the old and well known Fourdrinier
paper-making machine and upon the acceptance of the invention
by the industry.
23 Patent Office file, patent 2,198,423. This file was not in the record before the
Supreme Court.
24 (D.C. Ill. 1942) 45 F. Supp. 927.
25 (7th Cir. 1943) 136 F. (2d) 159.
26 321 U.S. 275, 64 S.Ct. 593 (1944).
27 Id. at 279.
28E.g., The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275 at 277, 283, 12 S.Ct. 443 (1892);
Expanded Metal v. Bradford, 214 U.S. 366 at 381, 29 S.Ct. 652 (1909); Keystone Mfg. Co.
v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 14 S.Ct. 295 (1894); Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire
Co., 220 U.S. 428, 31 S.Ct. 444 (1911). For an analysis of some of the leading decisions
of the past sustaining patents issued over very close prior art, see Dodds and Crotty,
"The New Doctrinal Trend," 30 J.P.O.S. 83 (1948).
29 Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45, 43 S.Ct. 322 (1923).
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Court decisions on direct review of Patent Office refusals to
grant patents furnish further examples. The 1944 decision of the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals in In re Shortell30 is particularly noteworthy. The patent sought was to a hacksaw blade
having teeth on both edges, the teeth on one edge having less set
than the teeth on the other edge. The prior art included saw
blades generally with teeth on both edges, together with one prior
art patent showing planing teeth of one set on one edge of the
blade and cutting teeth of different set on the other edge. The
margin of novelty was plainly small, yet the court reversed the
Patent Office and held that invention was present.
The Shortell decision rests in part on the showing of commercial success and upon the fact that the best reference was some
· sixty years old. As to the latter point the court stated, "If this
improvement was obvious to one skilled in the art, as held by the
Patent Office tribunals, it seems to us that sixty years would not
have elapsed before it was made."31
A second theme of broader importance runs through the
Shortell opinion. The court specifically noted the "flash of creative genius" requirement expressed by the Supreme Court in the
Cuno decision,32 and the related expressions of other courts that
there was a "new doctrinal trend" toward higher standards of
invention.33 The court nevertheless-adhered to earlier standards
of invention, stating:
"While recognizing, of course, that it is the duty of this
court to follow the law as declared by the Supreme Court, we
do not conceive it to be our duty to change our basis of decision merely because some courts assume that there is a 'new
doctrinal trend' with regard to the standards required for
invention.
"In our opinion it is not within the province of the courts
to establish new standards by which invention is to be determined. It seems clear to us that the creation of new standards
for the determination of what constitutes invention would be
judicial legislation and not judicial interpretation.
"It follows, from the foregoing, that until Congress shall
otherwise legislate, or the Supreme Court shall otherwise
specifically hold, this court will continue to hold that if a
30

(C.C.P.A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 292.
294.
Eng. Corp. v. The Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 at 91, 62 S.Ct. 37

31 Id. at
32 Cuno

(1941).
33 Especially Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., (2d Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 632.
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process or thing constitutes patentable subject matter, is new
and useful, and the process performed or thing produced
would not be obvious to one skilled in the art, invention
should be presumed and a patent may properly issue therefor. "34
More recently, in Pattinson v. Marzall3 5 the Patent Office refused to allow a patent application to a method of storing natural
gas in underground salt cavities. The prior art included instances
of using underground cavities generally for this purpose. Thus
the purported invention differed from the prior art only in the
use of salt cavities as distinguished from other cavities, a difference
considered by the Patent Office to be within the skill of the calling.
On bill in equity to review the Patent Office decision the district
court concluded that the salt cavities had special advantages for
the purpose, that simplicity and obviousness formed no criteria
of invention, and that the Patent Office erred in refusing the
patent application.
The ammoniated dentrifice litigation is also illuminating. In
Ex parte Kesel,36 the Patent Office Board of Appeals held that
claims directed to a dentifrice having "at least about 1% by weight
of a nontoxic salt of ammonia" were not allowable because the
prior art showed the use of ammonium salts as a dentrifice and
there was nothing to indicate that the particular proportion was
critical. A claim specifying a range of one percent to seven percent was similarly held not to define invention. Kesel thereupon
filed bill in equity to have the Patent Office refusal reviewed.
During the pendency of the bill the patent examiner became satisfied that a claim to "not less than 2%" dibasic ammonium phosphate was allowable. In a recent decision, the Kesel-patent as
. thus issued was upheld as directed to invention.37
To be sure, these examples do not dispose of the apparently
critical recent Supreme Court decisions. Of these the Cuno case38
is most well known, especially for the statement of Justice Douglas
that, ". . . the new device, however useful it may be, must reveal
the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling.
If it fails, it has not established its right to a private grant on the
(C.C.P.A. 1944) 142 F. (2d) 292 at 296.
(D.C.D.C. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 787.
36103 U.S.P.Q. 103 (1952).
37 The University of Illinois Foundation v. Block Drug Co., (D.C. Ill. 1955) 107
U.S.P.Q. 159.
38 314 U.S. 84, 62 S.Ct. 37 (1941).
34
35
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public domain. " 39 As presented to the Supreme Court, however,
the case involved a contention that, ". . . degree of invention or
ingenuity is not a test contemplated by the Constitution and the
patent laws to determine whether or not an invention or discovery
shall receive protection. . . . Congress could have entailed limitations as to the degree of invention to be rewarded by patents but
it has never done so."40
In substance, the Court was being asked to overrule the doctrine laid down in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood41 almost a century
earlier. The statement of Justice Douglas appears to have been
made more as an emphatic answer to this extreme contention than
as establishing a new standard of invention. There is some indication that he himself so regarded it.42 In any event, as the concurring opinion in the Cuno case points out, there was a deviation
between what was shown in the patent and the structure said to
be an infringement and the case clearly entailed a rather broad
patent interpretation making the prior art structures particularly
relevant.
The A. and P. case43 and its sequel, the per curiam Crest
Specialty decision,44 are likewise frequently referred to as recent
Supreme Court decisions indicating that the Patent Office deviated
from the proper standards of invention. Yet each case reached
the Supreme Court after unanimous and concurrent fact findings
of the lower courts that invention was present, and this alone
would seem sufficient vindication of the Patent Office actions.
More importantly, the A. and P. decision, in listing examples of
cases where the Court had sustained combination patents, mentioned two decisions upholding extremely minor changes as "in.vention." 45 One of these cases contains the classic statement:
39

Id. at 91.

40 Brief for Petitioner, No. 6, OcL Term
4111 How. (52 U.S.) 248 (1850).
42 In a note to the concurring opinion

1941, pp. 42-43.

in Great A. &: P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 at 154, 71 S.Ct. 127 (1950), Justice Douglas lists some
six earlier cases using the term "genius" to describe patentable invention. The text
referring to the footnote reads, "through the years the opinions of the Court commonly
have taken 'inventive genius' as the test."
43 Great A. &: P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 71 S.Ct.
127 (1950).
44 Crest Specialty v. David C. Trager, 341 U.S. 912, 71 S.CL 733 (1951).
45 Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139, 14 S.Ct. 295 (1894); Diamond Rubber
Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 31 S.Ct. 444 (1911). The Keystone case
related to a patented corn shelling machine. The machine was identical with the prior
art machine save only that the direction of rotation of a winged shaft was reversed.
In the prior art machine the shaft turned oppositely to the movement of the com and
thus tended to throw the com back and thereby contribute to clogging. The reversal
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"
Knowledge after the event is always easy, and problems
once solved present no difficulties, indeed, may be represented as never having had any, and expert witnesses may
be brought forward to show that the new thing which seemed
to have eluded the search of the world was always ready at
hand and easy to be seen by a merely skillful attention. But
the law has other tests of the invention than subtle conjectures
of what might have been but was not . . . . " 46
Any attempt completely to reconcile all of these decisions
would be futile. They do show, however, that the Patent Office
is hardly as anxious to "spawn" a list of "incredible patents" as
has been suggested. Rather, the record indicates that the office
is steering a middle course, not as liberal as some of the decisions
might justify and more liberal than the statements that can be
taken from others. Contentions that a particular application
shows "invention" of the level of the Eibel and Ray-O-Vac cases,
for example, are not likely to be successful at the Patent Office
level, at least until supported by a factual showing of the unusual
commercial circumstances of those cases. On the other hand, the
office does not rely upon a literal "flash of genius" requirement
such as is expressed in the Cuno decision, particularly since the
1952 patent code now expressly negatives that test.47

File Wrapper Estoppel
Patent Office examining activity has an aspect somewhat apart
from the question of invention. When the applicant files the
application he makes "claims" specifying the scope of the patent
desired. The Patent Office is charged with the duty of examining
the application and of issuing the patent only if "it appears that
the applicant is entitled to a patent under the law."48 In practice
the examination consists of collecting the closest prior art and, in
of shaft rotation tended to cause the com to be thrown in the direction of movement
through the machine and thereby reduced the problem of clogging. The Diamond case
involved a solid rubber-tired wheel construction wherein the wheel rim had outwardly
inclined sides. The prior art included like solid rubber-tired wheel constructions where
the sides of the rim were not inclined and wherein the sides inclined inwardly rather
than outwardly. Drawings of the respective constructions are reproduced in the opinion,
at 432 and 438.
46 Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 at 435, 31
S.Ct. 444 (1911).
'
47 " ••• Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the invention
was made." 35 U.S.C. (1952) §103. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
48 35 u.s.c. (1952) §131.
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most instances, of rejecting the claims one or more times as not
defining invention over that art. To overcome such rejections
the patent applicant of necessity must argue that the claims are
allowable and point out wherein invention is defined over the
specific prior art located. This process of argumentation, and
particularly the cancellation or amendment of claims, results in
a Patent Office file which frequently includes a "file wrapper
estoppel" of importance in fixing the scope of the patent as issued.
The file wrapper estoppel doctrine is of major importance in
cases where the patentee must have the benefit of some liberality
in the construction of patent claims. Such occasions arise frequently because it is often possible to appropriate the principle
of an invention and at the same time escape the literal language
of the claims-an opportunity seldom overlooked by an infringer.
In consequence, the patentee must argue that the infringement is
the "equivalent" of the invention as claimed. Recognizing this
practical problem "on proper occasions courts make [the claims]
cover more than their meaning will bear" to hold as an infringement a structure which does not respond to the literal claim
language.49 This is the "doctrine of equivalents."
The doctrine of equivalents is itself limited by the file wrapper
estoppel doctrine. Its nature is best illustrated by the Ace Patents
case.50 There the patent related to a bumper switch of the type
commonly used in pinball games. The switch consisted of a
pendulous helical spring which, when struck by the ball rolling
down the table, is flexed sideways to make contact with a fixed
contact and thereby actuate the electrical mechanism of the game.
As filed, the patent claims recited that the fixed contact need only
be "carried by the table." In this form the claims were rejected
on prior art patents. In a successful effort to overcome the rejection the applicant substituted the more restrictive expression
that the fixed contact be "embedded in" the table. The subsequent patent infringement suit involved two accused structures.
In one of these the fixed contact was in fact embedded in the table.
In the other the defendant had made the rather obvious and
superficial change of providing a separate cover plate to carry the
fixed contact over an opening in the table so that, while carried
by the table, the contact was not embedded in it. The patentee
49 Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, Inc., (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 691
at 692.
50 Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 62 S.Ct. 513 (1942).
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argued that the construction with the separate cover plate was
"equivalent" to embedding the contact in the table and that in
any event there was a literal evasion of the claim without alteration
of result or mode of operation.
The Court held that the patentee could not utilize the doctrine
of equivalents to hold as an infringement the construction wherein
the fixed contact was not literally "embedded in" the table. It
assumed that "the patentee would have been entitled to equivalents embracing the accused devices had he originally claimed a
'conductor means embedded in the table.' " 51 However, looking to
the language of the claims as filed, and especially to the phrase
"carried by the table," the Court concluded, "By striking that
phrase from the claim and substituting for it 'embedded in the
table', the applicant restricted his claims to those combinations in
which the conductor means, though carried by the table, is also
embedded in it. By the amendment, he recognized and emphasized the difference between the two phrases and proclaimed his
abandonment of all that is embraced in that difference.'' 52 The
Court went on to conclude that from the standpoint of claim
construction "the difference which [ the applicant] thus disclaimed
must be regarded as material, and since the amendment operates
as a disclaimer of that difference it must be strictly construed
against him.'' 53 Accordingly, the Court found infringement as
to the structure with the contact literally embedded in the table
but not the structure wherein the contact was only "carried by"
the table.
In a more recent case54 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit summarized the file wrapper estoppel doctrine in even
more farreaching terms to hold that: ". . . a patentee who has
changed the form of his claim during its prosecution disclaims the
scope of the claim in its earlier form, and the change effected by
the amendment must be construed against the patentee. He is
not permitted thereafter to recapture what he has disclaimed or
assert the claim against any equivalents that would respond to the
claim in its earlier form but which do not respond expressly to
the claim as issued.''
The file wrapper estoppel doctrine finds expression in com51 Id. at 136.
52Ibid.
53 Id. at 137.
54 Dixie

Cup Co. v. Paper Container Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 169 F. (2d) 645 at 648.
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paratively early patent decisions.55 It finds its roots in the rules
governing the construction of documents generally. Thus an
analogy has been drawn to the construction of contracts.56 Similarly, legislation has been construed in the light of what was proposed and not passed.57 Additional analogy may be found in
court insistence that a patentee follow a consistent interpretation
of a patent in successive patent infringement proceedings.58
The file wrapper ·estoppel doctrine is of particular interest
because of the absolute finality it imparts to Patent Office rulings.
The courts have consistently refused to go behind the Patent Office
action upon which the estoppel is based. The plausible, and
sometimes sound, argument that the rejection should not have
been made in the first place has been discarded. As stated in the
Ace Patents case, "as the question is one of construction of the
claim, it is immaterial whether the examiner was right qr wrong
in rejecting the claim as filed." 59 In substance the courts have
insisted that the patentee make his case before the Patent Office
or forever be silent.
To be sure, the file wrapper estoppel doctrine goes to the scope
of the patent-not to its validity. It is nonetheless of importance
in the practical operation of the patent system. The scope of a
patent determines its influence upon competitive enterprise as
significantly as the fact of the patent. Thus in the Ace Patents
case the Court drew a sharp line between the machines with condµctors "embedded in" the table-which were held to infringeand the competitively equivalent machines with conductors only
"carried by" the table-which were held not to infringe. So far
as conductor means were "carried by" the table are concerned
there might just as well have been no patent at all. There is thus
good reason to believe that through the file wrapper estoppel
doctrine the Patent Office examining activity has served a useful
purpose in defining strictly the scope of the grant.
55 E.g., Sargent v. Hall Safe and Lock Co., 114 U.S. 63, 5 S.Ct. 1021 (1885); Hubbell
v. United States, 179 U.S. 77 at 83, 21 S.Ct. 24 (1900); Shepard v. Carrigan, 116 U.S. 593,
6 S.Ct. 493 (1886).
56 E.g., Knick v. Bowes "Seal Fast" Corp., (8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 442; Power v.
Mola Washing Machine Co., (8th Cir. 1931) 49 F. (2d) 1009; Magic Light Co. v. Economy
Gas-Lamp Co., (7th Cir. 1899) 97 F. 87.
<57 E.g., Federal Security Administrator v. Quaker Oats Co., 318 U.S. 218, 63 S.Ct.
589 (1943); Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 71 S.Ct. 745 (1951).
58 Union Carbide and Carbon Corp. v. Graver Tank &: Mfg. Co., (7th Cir. 1948) 196
F. (2d) 103, cert. den. 343 U.S. 967, 72 S.Ct. 1059 (1952), 344 U.S. 849, 73 S.Ct. 6 (1952).
59 315 U.S. 126 at 137, 62 S.Ct. 513 (1942).
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The file wrapper estoppel doctrine, like all legal principles,
has its own limitations. One is that its full application requires
that the patent examiner locate the best prior art. Secondly, there
is a line of decisions, principally in the Second Circuit, holding
in effect that the doctrine does not apply unless claims are cancelled or formally amended. 60 Also one can point to decisions
where the courts, apparently impressed with the significance of the
invention, have seemingly refused to apply the doctrine. 61
Finally, it should be noted that the patent applicant can avoid
a file wrapper estoppel. If he knows the prior art and is modest
in his claims as filed, he may never be forced to make the limiting
arg1:1ments and claim amendments that give rise to the estoppel.62
Even as thus limited, however, the doctrine is a factor in a substantial proportion of the patent cases and should not be overlooked in evaluating the work of the Patent Office.
It cannot be denied that the statistical record-early and lateindicates that an issued patent is one thing and a valid patent
another. The tendency to equate this record with Patent Office
error is, it is submitted, a dubious generalization. Rather, the
more complete prior art available in an infringement suit, the
intervening period of commercial experience with the patented
product or process, the differences between the patent interpretation urged before a court and that in the Patent Office, and other
factors all combine to make court scrutiny of a patent something
far different from that possible in the Patent Office.
It follows that mere strictness in the examining function is not
likely to dissipate the uncertainties. To be sure, the Patent Office
could follow a severe rule that would preclude patent issuance in
the presence of any lingering doubt that a court would uphold
the patent. But few patents would issue under such a rule and
the office would doubtless face an unreasonable number of reversals by the courts on direct review. More importantly, such a
rule would cut off many patents destined to be upheld in court,
and surely the patent law contemplates the issuance of such
patents. It would seem that the only practical approach is an
intermediate one along the lines of that now being followed.
60 E.g., Spalding & Bros. v. John Wanamaker, (2d Cir. 1919) 256 F. 530; Keith v.
Chas. E. Hires Co., (2d Cir. 1940) 116 F. (2d) 46.
61 E.g., Hunt v. Armour & Co., (7th Cir. 1950) 185 F. (2d) 722.
62 It has been suggested that this occurred in Graver Tank v. Linde Air Products,
339 U.S. 605, 70 S.Ct. 854 (1950). See dissenting opinion of Justice Black at 616.
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There is opportunity for improvement in a different direction.
Current Patent Office prior art files include millions of items. The
process of classification and search is staggering. The office is
engaged in a losing task of ~eeping current with the items being
added to its files. There is reason to believe that automatic techniques may permit a complete and rapid collection of all the prior
art items without laborious searching. Interim measures also offer
great promise in this direction, provided the necessary financial
support is made available. 63 With more complete collection of
the prior art, the resultant Patent Office proceedings are likely in
a greater proportion of cases to lead to a file wrapper record of a
type precluding the elastic patent interpretations that are one
cause of difficulty.
At best, however, we shall continue to experience substantial
patent mortality in the courts. In like measure the outcome of
patent controversies will remain unpredictable. But this condition
is not unique, as practitioners in the field of personal injury and
antitrust law can attest. Rather, this uncertainty is the price that
must be paid for the test based on the fictitious ordinary man
skilled in the art, which to the present date appears to be the only
reasonably adequate measure of what should be rewarded by
patent grant and what should not.
63 For a review of the current problems of the Patent Office, see 37 J.P.O.S. 769
(1955). The problem of classification and search is discussed at p. 801 et seq.

